# How Threats of Exclusion Mobilize Palestinian Political **Participation**

# Supplementary Information

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## A Land Swaps and Public Opinion Data

As noted in the main text, a potential land swap and transfer of Triangle localities to the Palestinian authorities has been proposed as a policy in the early 2000s. Data from a nationally representative survey of PCIs in 2017 suggests that Triangle citizens were still worried about potential land-transfers even eleven years after Lieberman's initial campaign regarding land swaps. This survey was implemented by Sammy Samooha, and was made publicly available by the Israeli Democracy Institute: https://dataisrael.idi.org.il/. As reported in Figure A1, compared with 57% of non-Triangle PCIs, 80% of Triangle PCI residents in the survey sample reported their worry that the Triangle would be transferred from Israel to the Palestinian authority.



Figure A1: **Triangle residents are more worried about potential land transfers to Palestinian Authority.** Triangle sub-sample includes 149 survey respondents, and non-triangle sub-sample include 555 respondents.

## **B** Voting Analyses

## **B.1** Descriptive Statistics

In Table A1, we provide descriptive statistics of the variables employed in our main analysis of non-Jewish and mixed Israeli localities. Table A2 reports similar statistics for all Israeli localities analyzed in Model 4 of Table 1 in the main text, and Models 4-6 in Table A5 below. The first four variables (Turnout, Arab Joint List VS, Likud VS, and Blue-White VS), are based on data retrieved from Israel's legislative election committee.<sup>15</sup>

We classify localities as either i) Jewish, or ii) Mixed and non-Jewish, based on data from the Israeli CBS. This data also includes locality level population statistics (2018), which we use in our analyses. Lastly, we employ data from the 2008 census to construct covariates employed in Table A5 below. However, it is important to note that the census, which was conducted 11 years before the elections we analyze, does not cover all localities.

Statistic	Ν	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Turnout	465	0.527	0.160	0.045	0.835
Arab Joint List VS	465	0.681	0.318	0.000	1.000
Likud VS	465	0.049	0.103	0.000	0.636
Blue-White VS	465	0.114	0.156	0.000	0.758
Triangle	465	0.065	0.246	0	1
Extended Triangle	465	0.103	0.305	0	1
Population 2018	405	23,959.800	90,450.840	177.000	919,438.000
Perc. Age 0-19	318	45.076	6.570	21.000	58.200
Perc. Age 65+	318	4.531	2.919	0.600	18.200
Perc. Age 85+	318	0.328	0.427	0.000	2.500
Perc. Academic	318	10.598	7.590	0.000	51.500
Perc. Employed	318	39.258	9.995	15.200	77.400
Housing Density	318	7.496	28.125	0.100	202.200
HH with Vehicle	318	63.309	11.533	19.800	93.600
Average Children per Women	318	2.767	0.378	1.400	3.600

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics - Non Jewish Localities

All variables starting with 'Perc. Age 0-19' are from the 2008 census.

In Figure A2 we present a map of Israeli localities. In this map, we depict the ten Triangle localities mentioned in Trump's peace plan in red. Other Jewish, Arab and mixed localities, as well as non-residential areas are depicted in grey.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>https://www.bechirot.gov.il/.



Figure A2: Israeli Localities – This map depicts Israeli localities. The ten treated Triangle localities which faced a threat to their citizenship status are shaded in red.

Statistic	Ν	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Turnout	3,639	0.712	0.118	0.045	1.095
Arab Joint List VS	3,639	0.090	0.253	0	1
Likud VS	3,639	0.214	0.186	0.000	0.873
Blue-White VS	3,639	0.327	0.230	0.000	0.780
Triangle	3,639	0.008	0.090	0	1
Population 2018	3,555	7,505.104	37,576.620	57.000	919,438.000
Perc. Age 0-19	3,126	37.382	10.193	8.000	69.200
Perc. Age 65+	3,126	7.378	6.451	0.000	73.700
Perc. Age 85+	3,126	0.909	1.639	0.000	18.900
Perc. Academic	3,126	25.057	13.812	0.000	68.900
Perc. Employed	3,126	66.038	14.364	15.200	98.500
Housing Density	3,126	2.157	11.142	0.000	202.200
HH with Vehicle	3,126	75.261	18.210	2.400	100.000
Average Children per Women	3,126	2.314	0.626	0.300	6.800

Table A2: Descriptive Statistics - All Localities

All variables starting with 'Perc. Age 0-19' are from the 2008 census.

#### **B.2** Modelling Assumptions

In this section, we present several analyses to bolster the credibility of our modeling assumptions. First, in Table A3 we report results from a balance check implemented with the xBalance package in R (Hansen and Bowers 2008). In this test we compare triangle and non-triangle localities along eight different covariates, as well as values of pre-treatment turnout. In our balance check, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of similarity in the overall sample (p < 0.325), as well as all but one covariate (Age\_0\_19), where the individual corresponding *p* value is smaller than 0.1. These overall results enhance our intuition that our selected control group (mixed and non-Jewish localities), is a suitable counterfactual control group for our study.

	adj.diff	Z	
Population_2018	-2634.99	-0.08	
Houshold_Density	0.00	0.04	
Academic_Education	-1.26	-0.50	
Vehicle_Per_Family	3.62	0.94	
Employment	1.98	0.59	
Age_0_19	4.16	1.90	•
Age_65	-0.92	-0.94	
Age_85	-0.19	-1.31	
Trunout	0.05	1.26	

Table A3: Balance of Triangle and Non-Triangle Localities

As mentioned in the main text, our difference-in-difference model relies on an assumption that other than being mentioned in Trump's peace plan, there are no other time-varying unobservable differences between treated and controlled localities, which vary over the second and third Israeli election cycles. In Figure A3, we rule out the possibility that changes in turnout between the second and third election cycle, were driven by changes in the number of voting stations in treated and controlled localities. Indeed, as demonstrated in Figure A3, the number of voting stations remains stable in both treated and controlled localities over the three elections we observe.

An alternative concern might be that the increase in turnout within treated localities is driven by changes in party candidate lists, such that before the third election, candidates from treated localities were positioned higher in their party's list. In Table A4, we rule out this possibility by showing that during the second and third election cycles, the number and position of PCI MKs from the Joint Arab List who reside in the Triangle area remains identical. More so, we show that the general composition of the Joint Arab List remains similar between the second and third election cycle.

	List for the 22nd Knesset	List for the 22nd Knesset
1	Ayman Odeh	Ayman Odeh
2	Matanes Shkhada	Matanes Shkhada
3	Ahmed Tibi <sup>†</sup>	Ahmed Tibi <sup>†</sup>
4	Abas Mansour	Abas Mansour
5	Aida Touma-Souleiman	Aida Touma-Souleiman
6	Walid Taha $^{\dagger}$	Walid Taha $^{\dagger}$
7	Ofer Cassif	Ofer Cassif
8	Heba Yazbek	Heba Yazbek
9	Osama Saadi	Osama Saadi
10	Yousef Jabareen <sup>†</sup>	Yousef Jabareen <sup>†</sup>
11	Said al-Harumi	Said al-Harumi
12	Jabar Asakla	Jabar Asakla
13	Sami Abu Shehadeh	Sami Abu Shehadeh
14	Sondos Saleh	Sondos Saleh
15	Iman Khatib-Yasin	Iman Khatib-Yasin

Table A4: Arab Joint List Candidates for the 22 and 23 Knesset – † denotes MKs from the Triangle area.



Figure A3: **Voting Stations by Locality Type** – Count of voting stations per locality type, by election cycle (2019-2020.)

#### B.2.1 Parallel Trends

In Figure A4 we demonstrate parallel trends in turnout going back to the 2015 elections. We do not include these elections in our main analyses, since doing so may lead to confounding, due to time-varying unobservables between 2015 and 2019, which we seek to sidestep by focusing on three close election within one calendar year. However, we construe Figure A4 as further evidence that our parallel trends assumption is reasonable in this case.

In Figure A5, we consider parallel trends for our full sample. As noted in the paper, the model focusing on the full sample, is not our primary analysis because the Jewish localities in this full-sample model do not serve as a good counterfactual for our 10 threatened triangle localities. Figure A5 is evidence of this intuition, and shows that the parallel trends assumption is likely violated in the case of this model, even if the effect estimate for this model is in the same direction as the others.

In Figures A6 through A9, we consider parallel trends in vote share for the political parties of interest. We construe these figures as strong evidence of parallel trends in the pre-treatment period for party vote share across all parties. This enhances our intuition that employing a difference-in-difference model to analyze voting in mixed and non-Jewish localities is a suitable empirical approach.



Figure A4: **Parallel Trends of Turnout**– This plot compares average turnout rates in the ten Triangle localities mentioned in Trump's plan (red), with 145 mixed and non-Jewish localities (blue), over four election cycles between 2015-2020.



Figure A5: Parallel trends in turnout in the full sample.



Figure A6: Parallel trends in Blue-White vote share in the non-Jewish sample.



Figure A7: Parallel trends in Arab vote share in the non-Jewish sample.



Figure A8: Parallel trends in Labor vote share in the non-Jewish sample.



Figure A9: Parallel trends in Likud vote share in the non-Jewish sample.

## **B.3** Robustness Checks

### B.3.1 Models with 2008 Census Controls

In Table A5, we present additional models, which include a battery of pre-treatment locality level controls. These controls are based on data from the 2008 census. One limitation of employing census data to create covariates, is that the census did not cover all localities, present in the 2019-2020 analysis. However, the results of these analyses, are still consistent with our main findings. Specifically, models 1-3 which focus on non-Jewish and mixed localities, and models 4-6 which consider all Israeli localities, provide a difference-in-difference estimator which is similar to the one reported in our main analyses in Table 1

### B.3.2 Models Excluding Jerusalem

As noted in the main text, our main analyses compare voting in the ten treated Triangle localities, with voting in all other non-Jewish and mixed localities in Israel. However, Jerusalem which is considered as a mixed locality, resides a sizable Palestinian population which is not enfranchised to vote in National Elections (Rokem, Weiss, and Miodownik 2018). Since Jerusalem is systematically different from all other localities in our analyses, we consider additional models without the city. As reported in Table A6, results are substantively similar when employing this additional specification.

		Turnout			
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
0.053 (0.027)	0.026 (0.026)	0.018 (0.027)	-0.070 (0.027)	-0.055 (0.027)	-0.058 (0.027)
0.138 (0.011)	0.138 (0.011)	0.138 (0.011)	-0.0003 (0.002)	-0.0003 (0.002)	-0.0003 (0.002)
0.027 (0.016)	0.027 (0.017)	0.027 (0.017)	0.119 (0.015)	0.119 (0.015)	0.119 (0.015)
-0.0001 (0.002)	0.0003 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.0002)	0.001 (0.0002)	0.0002 (0.0002)
0.004 (0.002)	0.007 (0.002)	0.006 (0.002)	0.002 (0.0003)	0.002 (0.0003)	0.003 (0.0003)
	-0.138 (0.061)	-0.126 (0.061)		-0.098 (0.024)	-0.115 (0.031)
	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)		0.001 (0.0002)	0.001 (0.0002)
	0.161 (0.037)	0.146 (0.051)		0.055 (0.006)	0.046 (0.006)
		0.003 (0.004)			0.001 (0.0005)
		0.009 (0.007)			0.001 (0.001)
		-0.043 (0.031)			0.004 (0.002)
Yes Locality Non-Jewish No	Yes Locality Non-Jewish No	Yes Locality Non-Jewish No	Yes Locality All No	Yes Locality All No	Yes Locality All
	(1) 0.053 (0.027) 0.138 (0.011) 0.027 (0.016) -0.0001 (0.002) 0.004 (0.002) Ves Locality Non-Jewish No 318	(1) (2)   0.053 0.026   (0.027) (0.026)   0.138 0.138   (0.011) (0.011)   0.027 0.027   (0.016) (0.017)   -0.0001 0.0003   (0.002) (0.002)   0.004 0.007   (0.002) -0.138   (0.061) -0.001   0.001) 0.161   (0.037) 0.161   (0.037) 0.161   Non-Jewish Non-Jewish   No No   318 318	(1) (2) (3)   0.053 0.026 0.018   (0.027) (0.026) (0.027)   0.138 0.138 0.138   (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)   0.027 0.027 0.027   (0.016) 0.007 0.001   -0.0001 0.0003 0.001   (0.002) 0.007 0.006   (0.002) 0.007 0.006   (0.001) 0.001 (0.002)   0.004 0.007 0.006   (0.002) -0.138 -0.126   (0.061) -0.001 (0.001)   -0.001 -0.001 (0.001)   0.003 (0.004) 0.003   (0.004) 0.161 0.146   (0.007) 0.003 0.003   (0.007) -0.043 0.031)   Ves Yes Yes Yes   Locality Non-Jewish Non-Jewish   No No No   318 318 </td <td><math display="block">\begin{array}{c cccc} (1) &amp; (2) &amp; (3) &amp; (4) \\ 0.053 &amp; 0.026 &amp; 0.018 &amp; -0.070 \\ (0.027) &amp; (0.026) &amp; (0.027) &amp; (0.027) \\ 0.138 &amp; 0.138 &amp; 0.138 &amp; 0.138 &amp; -0.0003 \\ (0.011) &amp; (0.011) &amp; (0.011) &amp; (0.002) \\ 0.027 &amp; 0.027 &amp; 0.027 &amp; 0.119 \\ (0.016) &amp; (0.017) &amp; (0.017) &amp; (0.015) \\ \hline &amp; -0.001 &amp; 0.003 &amp; 0.001 &amp; 0.001 \\ (0.002) &amp; (0.002) &amp; (0.002) &amp; (0.002) \\ 0.004 &amp; 0.007 &amp; 0.006 &amp; 0.002 \\ (0.002) &amp; (0.002) &amp; (0.002) &amp; (0.003) \\ \hline &amp; -0.138 &amp; -0.126 \\ (0.061) &amp; (0.061) &amp; \\ \hline &amp; -0.001 &amp; -0.001 \\ (0.001) &amp; (0.001) &amp; \\ \hline &amp; &amp; 0.161 &amp; 0.146 \\ (0.037) &amp; (0.051) &amp; \\ \hline &amp; &amp; 0.003 \\ (0.004) &amp; \\ \hline &amp; &amp; 0.009 \\ (0.007) &amp; -0.043 \\ (0.031) &amp; \\ \hline &amp; &amp; Ves &amp; Yes &amp; Yes \\ Locality &amp; Locality &amp; Locality \\ Non-Jewish &amp; Non-Jewish &amp; Non-Jewish \\ Non &amp; No &amp; No \\ 318 &amp; 318 &amp; 318 &amp; 318 &amp; 3,126 \\ \end{array}</math></td> <td>(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)0.0530.0260.018-0.070-0.055(0.027)(0.026)(0.027)(0.027)(0.027)0.1380.1380.1380.138-0.0003-0.0003(0.011)(0.011)(0.011)(0.012)0.002)(0.002)0.0270.0270.0270.0270.1190.119(0.016)(0.017)(0.017)(0.015)(0.015)0.001-0.00010.00030.0010.001(0.002)(0.002)0.0040.0070.0060.002(0.003)(0.003)-0.138-0.126-0.098(0.024)(0.024)-0.001-0.001(0.001)(0.001)(0.002)0.003(0.001)0.001(0.002)(0.002)0.0040.0070.0060.002(0.002)0.005-0.01(0.061)(0.024)(0.024)-0.031(0.061)(0.061)(0.004)(0.002)0.003(0.001)(0.001)(0.001)(0.002)0.003(0.007)-0.043(0.007)(0.005)0.009-0.043(0.031)-0.043(0.031)YesYesYesYesYesLocalityLocalityLocalityAllNoNoNoNoNo3183183183183126</td>	$\begin{array}{c cccc} (1) & (2) & (3) & (4) \\ 0.053 & 0.026 & 0.018 & -0.070 \\ (0.027) & (0.026) & (0.027) & (0.027) \\ 0.138 & 0.138 & 0.138 & 0.138 & -0.0003 \\ (0.011) & (0.011) & (0.011) & (0.002) \\ 0.027 & 0.027 & 0.027 & 0.119 \\ (0.016) & (0.017) & (0.017) & (0.015) \\ \hline & -0.001 & 0.003 & 0.001 & 0.001 \\ (0.002) & (0.002) & (0.002) & (0.002) \\ 0.004 & 0.007 & 0.006 & 0.002 \\ (0.002) & (0.002) & (0.002) & (0.003) \\ \hline & -0.138 & -0.126 \\ (0.061) & (0.061) & \\ \hline & -0.001 & -0.001 \\ (0.001) & (0.001) & \\ \hline & & 0.161 & 0.146 \\ (0.037) & (0.051) & \\ \hline & & 0.003 \\ (0.004) & \\ \hline & & 0.009 \\ (0.007) & -0.043 \\ (0.031) & \\ \hline & & Ves & Yes & Yes \\ Locality & Locality & Locality \\ Non-Jewish & Non-Jewish & Non-Jewish \\ Non & No & No \\ 318 & 318 & 318 & 318 & 3,126 \\ \end{array}$	(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)0.0530.0260.018-0.070-0.055(0.027)(0.026)(0.027)(0.027)(0.027)0.1380.1380.1380.138-0.0003-0.0003(0.011)(0.011)(0.011)(0.012)0.002)(0.002)0.0270.0270.0270.0270.1190.119(0.016)(0.017)(0.017)(0.015)(0.015)0.001-0.00010.00030.0010.001(0.002)(0.002)0.0040.0070.0060.002(0.003)(0.003)-0.138-0.126-0.098(0.024)(0.024)-0.001-0.001(0.001)(0.001)(0.002)0.003(0.001)0.001(0.002)(0.002)0.0040.0070.0060.002(0.002)0.005-0.01(0.061)(0.024)(0.024)-0.031(0.061)(0.061)(0.004)(0.002)0.003(0.001)(0.001)(0.001)(0.002)0.003(0.007)-0.043(0.007)(0.005)0.009-0.043(0.031)-0.043(0.031)YesYesYesYesYesLocalityLocalityLocalityAllNoNoNoNoNo3183183183183126

# Table A5: Deal of the Century Effect on Turnout (2008 Census Covariates)

	Turnout				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Triangle	0.067	0.067	0.066	0.067	
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.019)	
Post	0.098	0.148	0.139	0.148	
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.002)	
Triangle * Post	0.023	0.023	0.026	0.023	
C	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.002)	
Population Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Edu Control	No	No	Yes	Yes	
Cycle FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Cluster	Locality	Locality	Locality	Locality + Cycle	
Sample	Non-Jewish	Non-Jewish	Non-Jewish	Non-Jewish	
Pre-Register	No	No	No	No	
<u>N</u>	402	402	315	402	

Table A6: Deal of the Century Effect on Turnout (No Jerusalem)

#### **B.4** Power

As noted in the main text, the results in Table 1 only approach conventional levels of statistical significance. It is important to acknowledge, that one limitation in our conservative empirical design relates to statistical power. Indeed, the decision to focus on mixed and non-Jewish localities over three successive elections in order to enhance the comparability of treated and controlled localities, and minimize concerns regarding temporal and cross-sectional confounding, comes at the cost of statistical power.<sup>16</sup>

We addressed this tradeoff as part of our pre-analysis plan. To do so, we considered the effect size which would allow us to identify positive changes in turnout, at conventional levels of statistical significance. Specifically, we used data from the first and second election cycles in 2019, to simulate diverging scenarios in which turnout in the Triangle area increased by 2%-4.5%. We based priors regarding effect sizes, on previous difference-in-difference models employed in the Israeli context of voting (Getmansky and Zeitzoff 2014).

In our pre-analysis plan (https://osf.io/wvup7/), we demonstrate that our models are suited to identify an increase in turnout of over 2.5% within Triangle localities, at conventional levels of statistical significance (p < 0.05). As our point estimate is right below this threshold, the p values presented in the main text, only approach conventional levels of statistical significance. However, the consistent results from our multiple robustness checks, as well as the significant results from models which increase sample size by considering all Israeli localities, increase our confidence in the papers' main finding.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup>Moreover, we avoid analyzing data at the voting station level, due to concerns relating changes in the assignment of voters' to stations within localities between elections.

#### **B.5** Vote Share Analyses

In the main text, we consider the effects of a threat of exclusion on minority turnout. In this section, we turn to consider whether exclusionary policies affect local support for different parties. Specifically, we employ similar difference-in-difference models, to focus on local support fo Likud (the party closely associated with Trump's declared plan and the exclusionary policy within it), its main competitor (at the time) Blue-White, and the Joint Arab list. Identifying null-effects across the board, would provide suggestive evidence that exclusionary policy increases political participation, without shaping the electorate's political preferences. However, identifying significant changes in local support for different parties would suggest that exclusionary policy might have important effects, which go well beyond increased turnout.

The results presented in Table A7 indicate that beyond impacting turnout, exclusionary policies might shape the electorate's preferences. However, in the Israeli case of PCI voting, this impact materialized in a somewhat unexpected fashion. In contrast to our expectation that Trump's plan would increase support for the Joint Arab List—the party most vocal against Trump's proposed plan and the threat to citizenship it imposes on Triangle residents—it appears that the party's vote share in the Triangle area did not change during the third election (Column 1 in Table A7). Likewise, we do not detect any effect on Likud vote share—an unsurprising finding given the limited support for Likud in PCI localities.

	Joint List	Likud	Blue-White
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Triangle	0.245	-0.053	-0.122
	(0.042)	(0.010)	(0.015)
_			
Post	0.191	-0.0005	-0.038
	(0.013)	(0.004)	(0.009)
Triangle * Post	-0.008	-0.003	0.020
	(0.025)	(0.003)	(0.007)
Population Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cycle FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cluster	Locality	Locality	Locality
Sample	Non-Jewish	Non-Jewish	Non-Jewish
Pre-Register	No	No	No
Ν	405	405	405

Table A7: Deal of the Century Effect on Party Vote Share

However, our difference-in-difference estimator for changes in Blue-White vote share is positive and statistically significant. The positive effect we identify suggests that PCI voters confronting a threat to their citizenship status (i.e. Triangle residents) responded by supporting the incumbent party's main competitor. Specifically, rather than voting for a sectorial party, which may or may not join forces in building an alternative coalition to the incumbent, Triangle voters were more likely to support a large non-sectorial party which at the time posed a political threat to the incumbent closely associated with Trump's peace plan.<sup>17</sup>

Note that we also consider a vote share model with locality and cycle fixed effects, seen in Table A8. The results using these models change very little, both in terms of substantive effects and in terms of statistical significance.

	Joint List	Likud	Blue-White
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Triangle			
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Post			
1 000	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Triangle * Post	-0.012	-0.003	0.025
	(0.025)	(0.003)	(0.006)
Cycle FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Locality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cluster	Locality	Locality	Locality
Sample	Non-Jewish	Non-Jewish	Non-Jewish
Pre-Register	No	No	No
N	465	465	465

Table A8: Deal of the Century Effect on Party Vote Share

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>It is important to emphasize that in general Blue-White vote share decreased in both treated and controlled localities between the second and third election cycle. Therefore, the most precise interpretation of Model 3 in Table A7, would suggest that Trump's decleration limited the decline in support for Blue-White, among Triangle voters, in comparison to non-Triangle voters, during the third election cycle.

## C Mobilization Analysis

## C.1 Descriptive Statistics

In Table A9 we report descriptive statistics of all variables used in our mobilization analysis. Note that this Table considers only mixed and non-Jewish localities which are the subject of our main analysis. As evident in Table A9, the average joining rate in our data for any given locality is less than 1. Indeed, in most locality-days no recruitment to the social movement's listserv takes place. For that reason, we consider a binary measure, rather than a count measure as our main outcome of interest.

Statistic	Ν	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Daily Join (Count)	203,980	0.044	2.663	0	805
Daily Join (Binary)	203,980	0.006	0.076	0	1
Triangle	203,980	0.065	0.246	0	1
Extended Triangle	203,980	0.103	0.304	0	1
Population 2018	177,660	23,959.800	90,339.360	177.000	919,438.000
Perc. Age 0-19	139,496	45.076	6.559	21.000	58.200
Perc. Age 65+	139,496	4.531	2.915	0.600	18.200
Perc. Age 85+	139,496	0.328	0.426	0.000	2.500
Perc. Academic	139,496	10.598	7.578	0.000	51.500
Perc. Employed	139,496	10.798	7.195	0.600	35.400
Housing Density	139,496	7.496	28.081	0.100	202.200
HH with Vehicle	139,496	63.309	11.514	19.800	93.600
Average Children per Woman	139,496	2.767	0.377	1.400	3.600

Table A9:	Descriptive	Statistics -	Non J	ewish I	Localities
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All variables following 'Perc. Age 0-19' are from the 2008 census.

#### C.2 Robustness Checks

In Table A10, we consider mobilization models that include the combination of locality-week fixed effects. These are immensely saturated models—these models introduce 35,185 fixed effects into the Non-Jewish analysis and 275,578 fixed effects into the full sample model. In spite of this, our results are largely the same, with the result for the Non-Jewish sample just barely insignificant at the 0.1 level.

In Table A13, we examine our results when restricting our data range of analysis to just 2019–2020, similar to the date range of our study 1 analysis. There are no changes in the direction or significance of results.

In Table A11 we provide additional models where we introduce locality-level demographic controls based on the 2008 Israeli census. Aside from including these demographic variables as controls, we also provide models (4) and (8) which look at the interaction of these census variables with year fixed effects, to account for the possibility of different trajectories for different localities. Doing so does not impact our main findings. In addition, in Table A12, we demonstrate that our main models are robust when considering Logit, rather than OLS models.

Throughout the paper, and up to this point in the Appendix, we model our outcome as dichotomous rather than using the number of sign ups. In Table A14, we examine results from negative binomial models using the count data, and the positive coefficient on our interaction term, while not directly interpretable, indicates a similar finding to the model in the paper. In Figure A10, we show more interpretable results in the form of expected first differences for triangle localities, prevs. post-Deal of the Century, which indicates approximately 0.1 more signups per day for these localities.

	Mobilization			
	(1)	(2)		
Post	0.061	0.008		
	(0.021)	(0.003)		
Triangle * Post	0.239	0.292		
	(0.147)	(0.145)		
Locality-Week Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes		
Sample	Non-Jewish	Full		
Ν	203,980	1,597,624		

Table A10: Deal of the Century Effect on Mobilization

				Mobilizat	ion			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Triangle	0.001 (0.003)	0.003 (0.002)	0.005 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.003 (0.001)	0.003 (0.001)	0.003 (0.001)	0.004 (0.001)
Post	0.021 (0.002)	0.021 (0.002)	0.021 (0.002)	0.021 (0.002)	0.006 (0.0005)	0.006 (0.0005)	0.006 (0.0005)	0.006 (0.0005)
Triangle*Post	0.019 (0.004)	0.019 (0.004)	0.019 (0.004)	0.023 (0.004)	0.028 (0.004)	0.028 (0.004)	0.028 (0.004)	0.027 (0.004)
Perc. Academic	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.0004)		0.0001 (0.00002)	0.0001 (0.00002)	0.0001 (0.00003)	
Perc. Employed	0.0003 (0.0002)	0.0004 (0.0002)	0.0003 (0.0002)		-0.0001 (0.00002)	-0.0001 (0.00002)	-0.0001 (0.00002)	
Housing Density		-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.005)			-0.0001 (0.001)	0.003 (0.002)	
HH with Vehicle		-0.001 (0.0003)	-0.0003 (0.0002)			-0.0001 (0.00002)	-0.00005 (0.00002)	
Average Children per Women		-0.006 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.006)			-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.0003)	
Perc. Age 0-19			0.001 (0.001)				-0.0001 (0.00004)	
Perc. Age 65+			0.001 (0.002)				0.0001 (0.00004)	
Perc. Age 85+			0.025 (0.012)				-0.0004 (0.0001)	
Week FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year * Census FE	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Cluster	Locality	Locality	Locality	Locality	Locality	Locality	Locality	Locality
Sample	Non-Jewish	Non-Jewish	Non-Jewish	Non-Jewish	All	All	All	All
Pre-Register	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
<u>N</u>	139,496	139,496	139,496	139,496	1,371,272	1,371,272	1,371,272	1,371,272

Table A11: Deal of the Century Effect on Mobilization (2008 Census Covariates)

	Mobilization		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Triangle	0.293	0.297	0.530
	(0.408)	(0.414)	(0.304)
Post	1.302	2.170	2.460
	(0.169)	(0.494)	(0.496)
Triangle*Post	0.697	0.714	0.577
	(0.220)	(0.218)	(0.212)
Week FE	No	Yes	Yes
Month FE	No	Yes	Yes
Year FE	No	Yes	Yes
Pop Control	No	No	Yes
Cluster	Locality	Locality	Locality
Sample	Non-Jewish	Non-Jewish	Non-Jewish
Pre-Register	No	No	No
Ν	203,980	203,980	177,660

Table A12: Deal of the Century Effect on Mobilization (Logit)

		Mobilization			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Triangle	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.002	0.009
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Post	0.008	0.042	0.048	0.048	0.013
	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.001)
Triangle*Post	0.018	0.018	0.017	0.010	0.023
C	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Week FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pop Control	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Cluster	Locality	Locality	Locality	Locality	Locality
Sample	Non-Jewish	Non-Jewish	Non-Jewish	Non-Jewish	Full
Treatment	10 Localities	10 Localities	10 Localities	16 Localities	10 Localities
Pre-Register	No	No	No	No	No
N	91,450	91,450	79,650	79,650	716,260

Table A13: Deal of the Century Effect on Mobilization, 2019–2020

Table A14. Deal of the Century	Fffect on Mobiliz	vation Negative B	inomial Models
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	Mobilization		
	(1)	(2)	
Triangle	1.060	1.655	
	(0.135)	(0.162)	
Post	1.227	1.274	
	(0.097)	(0.049)	
Triangle * Post	0.656	0.801	
	(0.306)	(0.383)	
Population Controls	Yes	Yes	
Sample	Non-Jewish	Full	
Ν	177,660	1,559,460	
Log Likelihood	-8,694.232	$-27,\!877.080$	
θ	0.008 (0.0003)	0.004 (0.0001)	
Akaike Inf. Crit.	17,398.470	55,764.170	



Figure A10: First Differences, Triangle Localities Pre- vs. Post-Deal of the Century. This figure shows the first differences for triangle localities pre- vs. post-deal of the century, using the model in column 1 of Table A14

## **D** Social Media Analysis

## D.1 Matching

Our social media analysis required using matching to find Arab localities similar to our treatment localities. We tested two different matching models, one with Mahalanobis distance and the other using propensity score matching. We ended up using the first because of its better match on 2018 population. We report our matching results, which motivate the selection of localities for the Facebook analysis in Table A15. In Table A16 we provide a list of matched Triangle and non-Triangle localities.

Variable	Original	Mahalanobis	PSM (Logit)
2018 Population	1.115	0.176	0.295
Turnout, April 2019	0.713	0.376	-0.505
Turnout, September 2019	1.033	0.952	-0.476

Table A15: Matching Results, Standardized Mean Difference

	Triangle	Non-Triangle (Match)
1	JALJULYE	KAFAR YASIF
2	KAFAR BARA	MAS'ADE
3	KAFAR QASEM	MUGHAR
4	AR'ARA	ARRABE
5	QALANSAWE	KAFAR KANNA
6	KAFAR QARA	REINE
7	UMM AL-FAHM	SHEFAR'AM
8	TIRE	HURA
9	TAYIBE	TAMRA
10	BAQA AL-GHARBIYYE	SAKHNIN

Table A16: Triangle and Matched Non-Triangle Localities